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EVIDENTIARY USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION: 
IS IT TIME FOR NEW YORK TO REEVALUATE ITS 
SINGULAR EXCEPTION? 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
BRONX COUNTY 
 
People v. Stanislous1 
(decided June 24, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In People v. Stanislous, evidence of photographic identifica-
tions made by two witnesses prior to trial was held admissible as evi-
dence.2  The People were permitted to introduce both the testimony 
of the identifying witnesses and the photos themselves.3  In granting 
the People’s motion, the court recognized “the issue of the admissi-
bility of evidence of photographic identifications involves an evolv-
ing area of law”4 and found the concerns which ordinarily bar the 
admission of such evidence were not present in the case before them.5  
The photographs, which were sought for admission at trial, were not 
unduly suggestive6 or prejudicial to the defendant, nor were the pho-
tographs of poor or uneven quality.7  Moreover, the court ruled in fa-
 
1 967 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 2013). 
2 Id. at 912. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 913. 
5 Id. at 915. 
6 See People v. Dunlap, 780 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2004) (stating the 
court must consider whether there was any substantial likelihood the defendant would be 
singled out for identification in determining whether a photo array is unduly suggestive); see 
generally 31 CARMODY-WAIT 2D §§174:49-174:63; People v. Cooper, 697 N.Y.S.2d 820, 
822 (Crim. Ct. 1999) (listing particular factors affecting the suggestiveness of photographic 
arrays, including “[t]he risk of suggestiveness in police-arranged identification procedures is 
the potential in a particular procedure for the police to influence the witness in selecting the 
defendant.”). 
7 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 915. 
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vor of admissibility, finding that, given the five year lapse of time 
since the murder, the exclusion of the pre-trial photographic identifi-
cation would restrict the prosecution’s ability to address the witness-
es’ ability to identify the defendant in court.8  The Bronx County Su-
preme Court’s ruling displays a relaxation to the exclusion of pre-trial 
photographic evidence at trial.  The court’s holding in Stanislous ap-
pears to be consistent with evolving case law in New York regarding 
the admissibility of photographic identification, despite New York’s 
traditional bar of such evidence at trial.9 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Stanislous involved the fatal shooting of Richard Tongue on 
July 26, 2008.10  At the Wade hearing,11 the assigned detective, De-
tective Rodriquez, testified to the following accounts of his investiga-
tion.12  Cornelius Barnes, a witness to the shooting, met with Detec-
tive Rodriquez and stated “he had observed an individual he knew as 
‘XL’ shoot Tongue.”13  About a month after the shooting, during a 
subsequent interview with Detective Rodriquez, Barnes accessed, 
downloaded, and printed a photograph14 of the defendant, which he 
identified as the individual he observed shoot the victim.15 
A few days later, Detective Rodriquez interviewed Glorious 
 
8 Id. (noting that “[d]uring jury selection, one juror raised the issue of how she could 
properly evaluate a witness’s identification testimony given the passage of so much time.”). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 912. 
11 See 32A N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law Procedure § 1624:  
A Wade hearing is a particular type of suppression hearing, the purpose 
of which is to test identification testimony for taint arising from official 
suggestion during police-arranged confrontations between a defendant 
and an eyewitness.  When the People serve statutory notice on a de-
fendant that they intend to introduce out-of-court identification testimo-
ny at trial, the defendant may choose to respond with a motion to sup-
press that testimony and, so long as the motion alleges undue 
suggestiveness, the defendant is generally entitled to a Wade hearing. 
Id.; see also N.Y. CRIM PROC § 710.30 (Mckinney 1970) (setting forth the proce-
dure and notice required by the People to the defendant when the People intend to 
introduce such evidence at trial). 
12 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 912. 
13 Id. 
14 See id. (noting the photograph depicted defendant wearing a t-shirt and jeans, with a 
backpack strapped over both of his shoulders, and the letters “XL” in purple on the bottom 
of the photograph). 
15 Id. 
2
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Landrum, an inmate at Rikers Island, who alleged to have seen the 
person he believed was the shooter.16  Landrum told Detective Rodri-
quez that he recognized the individual from Truman High School, 
where he and the alleged shooter both attended.17  Detective Rodri-
guez then showed Landrum the twenty-eight page Truman High 
School year book.18  The detective slowly turned the pages until he 
reached page forty-nine, at which time Landrum identified the de-
fendant as the individual that he saw run past him with a gun in-hand 
shortly after hearing shots fired on the night of the murder.19 
A few days after the interview with Landrum, Detective Ro-
driguez again interviewed Barnes and presented to him “a photo array 
consisting of [the] defendant’s headshot from the Truman High 
School yearbook and five other Truman yearbook headshots of 
young, dark-skinned, black men identically dressed in black tuxedos, 
white shirts and red bow ties.”20  Barnes identified the defendant’s 
photograph as the individual he witnessed shoot Tongue.21  Subse-
quently, the defendant was arrested and taken to the precinct for pro-
cessing.22  During processing, prior to having been administered Mi-
randa warnings, another detective asked the defendant “if he goes by 
any nicknames, to which defendant answered, ‘XL.’ ”23  The court 
found the statement was admissible under the pedigree exception to 
Miranda.24  The defendant was later placed in a lineup, without his 
 
16 Id. 
17 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 912. 
18 See id. at 912 (consisting of 335 headshot photographs of the senior class; 153 males 
and 92 of the 153 males were dark-skinned African Americans). 
19 Id. at 912-13 (“All of the young men depicted in the yearbook were of the same age, 
and were wearing black tuxedos, white shirts with black studs and red bow ties.  On the page 
with defendant’s photograph, there were 11 other photographs, 4 of which were black 
males.”). 
20 Id at 913; see N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law Procedure § 697, which states:  
There is no requirement that the participants in a photo array be identi-
cal in appearance, or that they all have virtually identical characteristics 
and features.  A photo array is not unduly suggestive, where the indi-
viduals depicted therein are sufficiently similar in appearance that the 
viewer’s attention is not drawn to any one photograph in such a way as 
to indicate that the police are urging a particular selection. 
Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 913. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.; see also 31 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law Procedure § 590: 
Pedigree questions may be asked of a defendant without providing Mi-
randa warnings and are limited in scope to those necessary for pro-
3
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counsel present, and was viewed by Barnes, who ultimately identified 
the defendant as the individual he observed shoot Tongue.25  The 
court found that the defendant’s right to counsel at the lineup was not 
violated because the lineup occurred prior to the defendant’s ar-
raignment and before counsel was entered on the defendant’s be-
half.26 
The court found that Barnes’s identification of the defendant’s 
MySpace photograph was admissible because “it was Barnes and not 
[Detective] Rodriquez, who had initiated this identification proce-
dure.”27  Further, the court found the procedures employed by Detec-
tive Rodriquez in showing the yearbook to Landrum, showing the 
photo array of the yearbook photos to Barnes, and administering the 
lineup were not “conducted in any way that could be considered sug-
gestive.”28 
Moreover, after the Wade hearing and prior to the com-
mencement of trial, the People sought a ruling on the admissibility of 
the photographic identifications made by both witnesses.29  The court 
initially set aside a decision on this issue; however, after reviewing 
“the history and evolution of the law regarding the admissibility evi-
dence of photographic identifications,” the evidence of the photo-
graphic identifications was found admissible.30  The opinion states, 
“[a]t trial both Barnes and Landrum testified to their respective pho-
tographic identifications of [the] defendant, and both the Truman 
High School yearbook photograph . . . and the photo array shown to 
Barnes were received in evidence.”31 
 
cessing a defendant or providing for his or her physical needs.  The test 
is not whether the information is inculpatory, but whether the police are 
trying to inculpate the defendant, or merely processing him or her.  
Thus, the fact that a statement in response to the pedigree question 
proves to be inculpatory does not destroy its pedigree status. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.; see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226 (1977) (stating the right to counsel 
attaches only after a criminal action commences); see also People v. Blake, 320 N.E.2d 625, 
628 (N.Y. 1974) (holding presence of counsel is not mandated and the state has no obliga-
tion to provide counsel at the investigatory lineup if an accusatory instrument has not been 
filed); see also People v. Hernandez, 517 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 (N.Y. 1987) (holding the de-
fendant had no right to have his counsel present at a pre-indictment lineup, even when the 
police knew the defendant had an unrelated pending case). 
27 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 913. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 912. 
30 Id. at 913. 
31 Id. 
4
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In addition, the court struck down the defendant’s claim that 
the admission of the photographic identifications improperly bol-
stered the witnesses’ in-court identifications of the defendant because 
such claims “only apply to the testimony of a third party about a pre-
vious identification,”32 and here “the [c]ourt did not permit any third 
parties to testify regarding any of the witnesses’ pre-trial identifica-
tions.”33 
III. THE COURTS ANALYSIS IN PEOPLE V. STANISLOUS 
In analyzing the admissibility of pre-trial photographic identi-
fications, the court first considered the decision rendered by the Court 
of Appeals in People v. Caserta.34  In Caserta, the Court of Appeals 
ruled that a previous identification from photographs is inadmissible 
based on the concerns that “not only is it readily possible to distort 
pictures as affecting identity, but also where the identification is 
[made] from [arrest photos] . . . the inference to the jury is obvious 
that the person has been in trouble with the law before.”35  In Caser-
ta, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder in the New 
York County Supreme Court for the murder of Danny Iglesia, the de-
fendant’s former business partner.36  At trial, several witnesses testi-
fied to their observation of the homicide and the details leading up to 
the murder;37 however, none of the testimony specifically linked the 
defendant to the crime.38  The only evidence that linked the defendant 
to the murder was the testimony of Police Officer Maimone, who 
stated that he observed the defendant, shortly after the murder oc-
 
32 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 915; see also People v. Trowbridge, 113 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 
1953), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Lagana, 324 N.E.2d 534, 535 (N.Y. 1975) 
(stating “CPL 60.25 overrules the effect of People v. Trowbridge by permitting the fact of 
the prior identification to be established by the testimony of another person when the identi-
fying witness is unable to make an identification at trial.”). 
33 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 915. 
34 224 N.E.2d 82 (N.Y. 1966). 
35 Id. at 83-84. 
36 Id. at 84. 
37 See id. (stating “[t]he most complete account of this bizarre homicide is given by the 
witness Ruth Bailey,” whose testimony was later supplemented by the testimony of other 
witnesses). 
38 Id.  The main witness who testified the most complete account of the murder from her 
bedroom window stated that “[s]he saw that the man had an object in his hand and that he 
was pointing it at the fellow who was lying on the street.”  Caserta, 224 N.E.2d at 84.  Fur-
ther, she testified seeing the man walk back to the car and proceed to drive slowly and then 
speed up hitting the fellow who was lying on the street.  Id. 
5
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curred driving the same type of vehicle that was later identified as the 
deceased’s.39  The defendant appealed his conviction, and the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court, First Department affirmed.40  The 
appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the 
lower court’s decision and ordered a new trial.41  The court focused 
on the question of identity and the admission of the prior photograph 
identification made by Officer Maimone of the defendant.42  The 
court found that the admission of “his previous identification of the 
defendant from photographs [was] contrary to the rulings in People v. 
Cioffi,”43 thereby requiring reversal.44 
The court noted that Caserta’s bar to the admission of photo-
graphic identifications was not absolute,45 and in addition to the lim-
ited exceptions to the Caserta rule, the court identified a case similar 
to the case at issue, which held the evidence of a prior identification 
made by the complaining witness from a videotape taken by the po-
lice admissible.46  People v. Edmonson47 involved a savage attack on 
the victim, and a jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of at-
tempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first and se-
cond degree for repeatedly assaulting the victim and choking her into 
unconsciousness, thus causing serious injuries.48  While the victim 
 
39 Id. at 85.  Officer Maimone’s patrol car was standing near the street where the murder 
occurred when he allegedly observed the defendant in a black 1964 Oldsmobile.  At the time 
of the observation he was not aware that a homicide occurred.  The officer testified that he 
noticed the car because it swerved in front of his patrol car and the driver gave him a “full 
stare.”  The police report, however, did not mention that the car swerved in front of the of-
ficer’s patrol car.  Id. 
40 Id. at 82. 
41 Caserta, 224 N.E.2d at 87. 
42 Id. at 85. 
43 133 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1956) (stating “[t]estimony to prior identification from pic-
tures has been held not to be admissible under section 393-b.”); see also People v. Hagedory, 
70 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1947) (finding that the “court below erroneously 
received in evidence . . . a photograph of the defendant, in connection with the testimony of 
a witness that shortly after the alleged robbery he had described to the police the appearance 
of the robbers and had identified the photograph as that of one of the men who had commit-
ted the crime.”). 
44 Caserta, 224 N.E.2d at 83. 
45 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (identifying that “photographic identification evidence 
has been admitted when the defendant has opened the door to its introduction; when the 
prosecution has impeached its own, hostile witness; or when defendant has chosen to elicit 
testimony about a pre-trial identification from photographs.”). 
46 Id. 
47 554 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1990). 
48 Id. at 1254. 
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was hospitalized, she gave a description of the defendant and his 
whereabouts to the police.49  The police then made a videotape and 
presented it to the victim for possible identification of the attacker.50  
The victim identified the man in the video as the one who attacked 
her, which led to the defendant’s arrest.51  The Court of Appeals in 
Edmonson reinstated the established rule that “suggestive pretrial 
identifications are to be excluded,”52 but explicitly concluded that 
“there is nothing inherently suggestive in the videotaping procedure 
employed here which should render evidence of the witness’s identi-
fication inadmissible.”53 
Further, in affirming the admissibility of the prior identifica-
tion made by the complaining witness, the court distinguished the 
“fatally flawed show-ups”54 in previous cases and the “potential prej-
udice”55 recognized in traditional photo arrays from the videotape 
procedure used in this case, where the defendant appeared “among 
many pedestrians in natural, nonpolice surroundings . . . viewed 
without any suggestive comment or conduct by police”56 and without 
involving the use of a “rogues’ gallery of mugshots . . . of poor or un-
even quality and easily distorted.”57  The court in Stanislous found 
the reasoning of Edmonson analogous to its current analysis, stating: 
[N]either of the concerns raised in Caserta concerning 
photographic identifications, are present.  The photo-
graphs at issue are from a high school yearbook, were 
 
49 Id. at 1255. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Edmonson, 554 N.E.2d at 1255. 
53 Id. at 1256 (noting “defendant was not singled-out, portrayed unfavorably, or in any 
other manner prejudiced by police conduct or comment or by the setting in which he was 
taped.”). 
54 Id. (“In Riley, the two suspects identified by the armed robbery victim were the only 
nonuniformed persons in the station house room and were positioned near a table bearing the 
stolen property and a weapon; in Rodriquez, the two identified suspects were shown hand-
cuffed and in civilian clothes, being escorted into the police barracks by two uniformed of-
ficers; and in Adams the victims were first informed that the police had the three suspected 
robbers in custody and then shown the suspects being held, by police officers with their 
hands behind their backs.”) (citing People v. Riley, 517 N.E.2d 520 (N.Y. 1987); People v. 
Rodriquez, 517 N.E.2d 520 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1981)). 
55 Id. (noting that the procedure used did not involve showing a witness a “rogues’ gallery 
of mug shots” which as expressed in Caserta would likely create an inference that the identi-
fied suspect has had previous trouble with the law). 
56 Id. 
57 Edmonson, 554 N.E.2d at 1256 (citing Caserta, 224 N.E.2d at 84). 
7
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clearly made using modern, sophisticated equipment, 
and are of superior quality.  They depict the students 
looking at their best—they are all dressed in formal at-
tire and many are smiling.  In short, as opposed to de-
picting a gallery of rogues, these photos are more aptly 
described as depicting a gallery of choir boys; thus, it 
is hard to see how defendant is prejudiced by their 
admission.58 
Moreover, Stanislous points to a recent Court of Appeals de-
cision, which further illustrates a relaxation of the Caserta bar to the 
admission of photographic identification as evidence at trial.59  Peo-
ple v. Perkins60 involved the conviction of a defendant for shooting a 
store clerk while committing a robbery.61  Three months later, the de-
fendant was arrested.62  As a result of the defendant’s behavior and 
his refusal to cooperate in a lineup, an array of photos was made of 
the intended corporeal lineup participants.63  The photographs were 
found to be admissible at trial, and the court found that although New 
York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.3064 has been interpreted to ex-
clude the admissibility of testimony of a prior photographic identifi-
cation,65 because of the possibility to distort pictures and the possibil-
ity of jurors to infer that the defendant has been in trouble with the 
law before when shown arrest photos in the array, “there is no indica-
tion that the Legislature intended to rule out photographic identifica-
tion evidence in the event a defendant thwarts a lineup.”66  Although 
the admissibility of the photographic identification in Perkins applied 
to situations where a defendant’s behavior prevented a lineup, the 
court in Stanislous interpreted the ruling to suggest that “there is no 
per se bar to admitting evidence of photographic identifications and 
that [the] trial courts have discretion to admit such evidence when the 
 
58 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 915. 
59 Id. at 914. 
60 932 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2010). 
61 Id. at 880. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (noting the victim identified the defendant from an array of photographs taken the 
day a lineup was scheduled). 
64 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.30 derives from N.Y. Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure § 
393-b. 
65 Perkins, 932 N.E.2d 879 at 882. 
66 Id. 
8
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situation warrants it.”67 
IV. FEDERAL APPROACH 
The evidentiary use of photographic identification relates 
back to the United States Supreme Court’s seminal case, United 
States v. Wade.68  Particularly pertinent to this case note is the Su-
preme Court’s discussion of the critical importance of fair identifica-
tion procedure because of the “high incidence of miscarriage of jus-
tice from mistaken identification.”69  Identification by photograph has 
been used widely and effectively in federal courts despite the hazards 
of misidentifications.70  The admissibility of pretrial photographic 
identification followed by in-court identification at trial is determined 
on a case-by-case analysis, as stated in Simmons v. United States.71  
The standard requires the exclusion of the photograph “only if the 
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly sugges-
tive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misi-
dentification.”72  Therefore, the appropriate inquiry for the court is 
whether the procedures followed were impermissibly suggestive, and 
then whether, being impermissibly suggestive, they created a substan-
tial risk of misidentification.73 
Although the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the 
danger that may result from the use of photographic identifications,74 
 
67 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citing Perkins, 932 N.E.2d 879). 
68 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
69 Id. at 228. 
70 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (stating this procedure is effective 
in criminal law enforcement “from the standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of 
sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them 
through scrutiny of photographs.”). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 384; see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967) (settling a similar 
issue on the question of identification by photograph). 
73 See United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977).  This is the proper test 
when a motion is made to exclude a photographic identification alleging that the array used 
was impermissibly suggestive.  The court notes “[t]o make these determinations, the [ ] 
courts . . . are to conduct in camera hearings to inquire into the circumstances of the chal-
lenged identification procedures.”  Id.  However, the granting of the evidentiary hearing lies 
within the sound discretion of the court.  Id. 
74 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383 (noting “[t]his danger will be increased if the police display 
to the witness only the picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person he 
saw, or if they show him the pictures of several persons among which the photograph of a 
single such individual recurs or is in some way emphasized.  The chance of misidentification 
is also heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that one 
9
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the Court was “unwilling to prohibit its employment, either in the ex-
ercise of our supervisory power, or still less, as a matter of constitu-
tional requirement.”75  In Simmons, the defendant was convicted of 
armed robbery of a federally insured savings bank.76  Photographs of 
the defendant were shown to five employees of the bank who wit-
nessed the robbery, all of whom identified the defendant as the rob-
ber.77  The defendant challenged his conviction in the Supreme Court 
and asserted that the pretrial identification procedure was “so unduly 
prejudicial as fatally to taint his conviction.”78  The Court responded 
that the claim asserted by the defendant “must be evaluated in light of 
the totality of surrounding circumstances.”79 
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in Stovall v. 
Denno,80 the Court concluded the defendant’s claim must fail due to 
the circumstances surrounding the procedure taken by the FBI and 
the photographs themselves “leave little room for doubt that the iden-
tification of [the defendant] was correct, even though the identifica-
tion procedure employed may have in some respects fallen short of 
the ideal.”81  Although the Court recognized potential flaws in the 
identification procedure, under the totality of surrounding circum-
stances, the Court found the photographic identification of the de-
fendant by all five witness’s “was not such as to deny [the defend-
ant’s] due process of law.”82 
The United States Supreme Court was faced with similar is-
sues regarding the admissibility of identifications at trial in Neil v. 
 
of the persons pictured committed the crime.”). 
75 Id. at 384. 
76 Id. at 379. 
77 Id. at 381. 
78 Id. at 383. 
79 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383 (citing Stovall, 388 U.S. 293 at 302). 
80 Stovall, 388 U.S. 293; see cases cited supra note 72. 
81 Simmons, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 385-86.  The Court in Simmons noted that the: 
[W]itnesses were shown the photographs only a day later, while their 
memories were still fresh.  At least six photographs were displayed to 
each witness.  Apparently, these consisted primarily of group photo-
graphs, with [both defendants] appearing several times in the series . . . .  
There is no evidence to indicate that the witnesses were told anything 
about the progress of the investigation, or that the FBI agents in any 
other way suggested which persons in the pictures were under suspi-
cion. 
Id. 
82 Id. at 386. 
10
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Biggers83 and Mason v. Braithwaite.84  The Court provided various 
“factors to be weighed against the [potential] corrupting effect of the 
suggestive procedure in assessing reliability”;85 such factors included 
the “opportunity [of the witness] to view the criminal at the time of 
the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior 
description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the 
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confronta-
tion.”86  These factors, reflecting the “totality of the circumstances” 
approach adopted in Simmons, are taken into consideration to deter-
mine whether “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidenti-
fication”87 existed at the time of the identification.  Absent this show-
ing, the pre-trial identification will be admissible at trial.88 
V. NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
New York has adopted additional precautionary measures, not 
seen in the federal courts, regarding the admissibility of pre-trial 
identifications in an attempt to protect against the dangers of misiden-
tification.89  The Court of Appeals has traditionally found photo-
graphic identifications made prior to trial inadmissible as evidence at 
trial.90  In reaching this determination, the court looked to Section 
393-b of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure,91 superseded by 
New York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.25 and § 60.30, which state 
“[w]hen identification of any person is in issue, a witness who has on 
a previous occasion identified such person may testify to such previ-
 
83 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
84 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
85 Id. at 98. 
86 Id. at 98-99. 
87 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384. 
88 Id. 
89 See Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383-84 (adopting a per se exclusion of the admission of sug-
gestive pre-trial identifications; “the rule excluding improper pretrial identifications bears 
directly on guilt or innocence.  It is designed to reduce the risk that the wrong person will be 
convicted as a result of suggestive identification procedures employed by the police.”). 
90 Cioffi, 133 N.E.2d at 705; Hagedorny, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 512; see also People v. Linsday, 
364 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (N.Y. 1977) (confirming “[i]t is settled however that a witness may 
not testify regarding a photographic identification of the defendant, nor may he refer to a 
composite sketch.”). 
91 See N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure §393-b, as added by L 1927, ch 336 in 1927 (the 
objective of this amendment was to permit prior testimony of a prior identification however 
the critical phrase “identified such person” was not defined in the statute). 
11
Giordano: Photographic Identification
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
956 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
ous identification.”92  The critical language, “identified such person,” 
was interpreted to require the previous identification to have been 
made of the defendant in the flesh in order to be admissible.93 
This interpretation of section 393-b of the New York Code of 
Criminal Procedure was first illustrated by the Second Department in 
People v. Hagedorny.94  The defendant in Hagedorny was on trial for 
robbery in the first degree.95  During trial, the People introduced into 
evidence a photograph that the testifying witness had previously 
identified as the defendant shortly after the robbery took place.96  
Further, the People called a second witness, who testified to state-
ments made to him by the first witness pertaining to the photograph 
identification.97  The trial court convicted the defendant of first de-
gree robbery, and the defendant appealed his conviction.98 
On appeal, the Second Department reversed the lower court’s 
judgment, finding “the court below erroneously received in evidence, 
during the People’s case, a photograph of the defendant, in connec-
tion with the testimony of a witness.”99  The court reasoned that alt-
hough the evidence “tended to identify the defendant, it was not evi-
dence that the witness had on a previous occasion identified ‘such 
person,’ [as stated in] Code of Criminal Procedure § 393-b, and was, 
at this stage of the trial, at least, inadmissible.”100  Thus, the Second 
Department interpreted the language in the statute as requiring the 
previous identification to be made of the defendant in person and not 
through the use of photographs.101  The court found the previous 
identification of the defendant in a photograph was not permissible 
for the purpose of supporting the testifying witness’s credibility of 
identifying the defendant in-court.102 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the interpretation adopted in 
 
92 N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure §393-b. 
93 Cioffi, 133 N.E.2d at 705; Hagedorny, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
94 70 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1947). 
95 Id. at 512. 
96 Id. (noting the photograph “was received [into evidence] on direct . . . and before there 
had been any attempt on the part of the defendant to impeach him.”). 
97 Id.  (testifying over defendant’s objection). 
98 Id. 
99 Hagedorny, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 512 (noting the court also found that it was error to admit 
the second witness’s testimony concerning the photo identification of the defendant); People 
v. Jung Hing, 106 N.E. 105 (N.Y. 1914). 
100 Hagedorny, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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Hagedorny in Cioffi.103  In Cioffi, the defendant was charged and 
convicted with assaulting two young girls.104  Although the defendant 
was tried for the alleged assault of both girls, the court only had ju-
risdiction to entertain the defendant’s appeal from his conviction of 
assaulting one of the girls.105  The charge was brought against the de-
fendant for allegedly placing his hands on the girl’s body, without 
removing her clothing, to which the defendant denied.106  The de-
fendant’s conviction rested on the testimony of the two girls, their 
schoolmates, and the detective.107  The two girls identified the de-
fendant as the man who had molested them, and two of their school-
mates and the detective were permitted to testify to the previous iden-
tification made of the defendant by the one girl from photographs.108  
Citing Hagedorny, the court stated “[t]estimony to prior identification 
from pictures has been held not to be admissible under section 393-b 
[of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure].”109  The court inter-
preted the statute as carving out a single exception to the inadmissi-
bility of prior identification at trial only when the previous identifica-
tion was made of the defendant in-person.110  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new tri-
al.111 
Subsequent case law follows the interpretation laid out by the 
Court of Appeals and the Second Department regarding the admissi-
bility of a previous photographic identification at trial.112  In Caserta, 
the Court of Appeals explained its justification for the exclusion of 
photographic identifications.113  After Caserta, courts continued to 
 
103 Cioffi, 133 N.E.2d at 704. 
104 Id. (noting one of the girls was eleven and the other was twelve years old). 
105 Id. (discussing why the court lacked jurisdiction as to the fourth count of the indict-
ment). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 704-05. 
108 Cioffi, 133 N.E.2d at 704-05. 
109 Id. at 705 (“The reception of this testimony was duly objected to at trial.”). 
110 Id. (“It is not to be confused with identification of a defendant by a witness in open 
court.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Caserta, 224 N.E.2d 82; see also People v. Griffin, 272 N.E.2d 477, 478 (N.Y. 1971) 
(extending the rationale for excluding pre-trial photographic identification to exclude the use 
of a composite sketch into evidence). 
113 Caserta, 224 N.E.2d at 83-84 (stating the two main concerns associated with identifi-
cations made through photographs: it is “readily possible to distort pictures as affecting iden-
tity[,]” and when the identification is from arrest photos “the inference to the jury is obvious 
that the person has been in trouble with the law before.”). 
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interpret New York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.25 and § 60.30, the 
same way they interpreted Criminal Code of Procedure § 393-b; thus, 
excluding prior identification of a defendant made in person through 
photographs, and only permitting prior identification of the defendant 
if it was made by the testifying witness.114 
VI. DOES NEW YORK’S TRADITIONAL EXCLUSION OF PRE-
TRIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATIONS STILL SERVE THE 
PURPOSE IT INTENDED? 
When the courts were presented with the issue regarding the 
admissibility of prior photographic identifications, the courts con-
cerns, which guided their decision to exclude such evidence, reflected 
the current status of technology.115  Because the two justifications for 
the exclusion of photographic evidence were to prevent prejudice to 
defendants, which is obvious when the prior identification was made 
from photo arrays consisting of prior arrest photos, and the concern 
that the photos may be easily distorted, it cannot be said that now, 
almost forty years later, all types of photographs or other prior identi-
fications are prohibited, especially if the circumstances do not preju-
dice the defendant due to our advances in technology.116  In 2005, the 
court noted: 
[i]n the intervening years, technological advances 
have not only made photographs unfailingly accurate, 
but advances in computer technology, barely in its in-
 
114 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.25 (1)(a)(ii) (providing that in a criminal proceeding a wit-
ness may testify “[o]n a subsequent occasion he observed . . . a person whom he recognized 
as the same person whom he had observed on the first or incriminating occasion”) (emphasis 
added); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.30(c) (providing the same language as §60.25).  This 
section was amended in 1977 and although a number of letters in the Bill Jacket use the term 
“in-person” identification, the term adopted was “a person.”  Id.  The Court still interpreted 
the language to mean “in-person” consistent with their previous interpretation. 
115 See People v. Woolcock, 729 N.Y.S.2d 804, 814 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (explaining that in the 
years in which Caserta and Griffin were decided, the Court of Appeals “expressed its con-
cern that photographs were subject to distortion and manipulation and, further, that by per-
mitting the jury to hear that the police were in possession of the defendant’s photographs, 
they would likely conclude that the defendant had a prior police record, resulting in severe 
prejudice to the defendant.”). 
116 See People v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 992, 996 (N.Y. 1990) (stating “the background of 
CPL 60.25 and 60.30 indicates that the Legislature intended by adoption of those statutory 
‘exceptions’ only to eliminate a technical bar to the receipt of probative evidence of identifi-
cation, not to preclude all use of similar testimony.”); see also Edmonson, 554 N.E.2d at 
1256 (reasoning that “the videotaping used in this case does not suffer the potential prejudice 
we have recognized in photo arrays.”). 
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fancy in [the 1970’s], when Griffin [and Caserta were] 
decided, ha[ve] reached a level of speed and sophisti-
cation so as to permit the rapid search of enormous da-
ta banks and the generation of photographs of striking 
similarity to the suspect.117 
Advances in technology allow courts to reevaluate the concerns ex-
pressed in Caserta.  Upholding New York’s exclusion of photograph-
ic identifications for concerns that are no longer relevant do not serve 
the purpose for which the exclusion intended.  If the photographs 
used for prior identification are not found to be prejudicial to the de-
fendant, the overriding concern for its exclusion, misidentification 
leading to wrongful convictions is not apparent, and there is no rea-
son to exclude the prior photographic identifications. 
In those instances, the admission of such prior identification 
will aid the trier of fact in evaluating the witness’s in-court identifica-
tion, thus resulting in more reliable convictions.  Provided the photo-
graphs themselves and the means of obtaining the photograph identi-
fication do not prejudice the defendant, there is no reason for their 
exclusion.  New York should reevaluate the reasoning for its original 
exclusion and adopt a modern test to determine the admissibility of 
pre-trial photographic identifications to allow their admission when 
the long-standing concerns of prejudice and misidentification are not 
present. 
A shift in this direction would result in the admission of pho-
tographic identifications in situations that will aid the trier of fact in 
weighing the evidence and assessing the witness’s ability to identify 
the defendant at trial, and this shift would still exclude such evidence 
where the concerns of distortion and prejudicial inference are present.  
Revising the existing rule and adopting a test that coincides with the 
advances in technology will allow evidence of pre-trial photographic 
identification of the defendant and, thus, will result in more reliable 
and just convictions.  Excluding such evidence when the photographs 
are not suggestive or prejudicial to the defendant is adverse to render-
ing reliable convictions. 
 
117 Woolcock, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 814. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The holding in People v. Stanislous118 displayed a deviation 
from New York’s traditional approach to the issue of the evidentiary 
use of photographic identifications at trial.119  The court recognized 
that the rationale underlying the precedent of excluding the eviden-
tiary use of photographic identifications was not present in the case 
before them.  The photographs of the defendant, taken from a high 
school yearbook,120 would not allow the inference to be drawn that 
the defendant had a prior criminal record.  On the contrary, an infer-
ence could be drawn that the defendant did not have an arrest record 
because the police used a high school yearbook photo for identifica-
tions purposes.  Further, the manner in which the photo depicted the 
defendant, in a tuxedo and bow tie, allowed the court to eliminate the 
concerns that originally excluded the admission of photographic iden-
tification at trial.  Neither the photo in the year book or the array, 
which consisted of several year book photos, presented any factors 
that would indicate they were unduly suggestive.121 
Although it may appear New York’s exclusion of photograph-
ic identification made prior to trial is enforced as a safeguard against 
misidentification, the reasoning for the exclusion is not always appar-
ent.  Therefore, the inadmissibility of such evidence may actually be 
working against justice.  Excluding this identification evidence, in the 
absence of prejudice, deprives the jury of evidence that would aid 
them in evaluating a testifying witness’s ability to identify the de-
fendant in-court. 
Daniela Giordano
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118 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 911. 
119 Id. 
120 Stanislous, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 915; see supra note 19. 
121 Id.; see cases cited supra notes 19-20. 
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